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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL

The parties to this Appeal are now:
Appellant/Plaintiff: Dee Henshaw
Appellee/defendants: Bonnie King and the Estate of Jack King
To the best of Mr. Henshaw's knowledge, there are no other parties or entities involved
in this case.
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ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE KINGS HAVE NEVER HAD STANDING TO ASSERT THAT
RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS, THE KINGS
SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, WHICH MILDRED WATROUS THEREAFTER
SOLD TO BARBARA HENSHAW AND BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO
DEE HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS TO DEE HENSHAW, THE TRIAL COURT
NEVER HAD JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE KINGS MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT, CLAIMING THAT RAYMOND'S INTEREST IN THE
WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH.
THEREFORE, THE DISTRICT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DENIED
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE ORDER
ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, HOLDING THAT RAYMOND'S
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED UPON
RAYMOND'S DEATH AND ULTIMATELY TO MR. HENSHAW.
POINT I
THE KINGS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASK ANY COURT TO
DETERMINE THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER
RIGHTS, THE KINGS SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, DID NOT PASS TO
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH.
Under clear and controlling Utah law, the Kings do not have standing to ask any
court to rule that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
On page 28, f 2 of their brief, the Kings falsely claim that standing is a
requirement only applicable to plaintiffs and not defendants. The Kings then go on to
falsely claim that they are simply defendants in this case, and, therefore, the requirements
of standing are not applicable to them. At best, those assertions are deliberate
misstatements of the facts and relevant law.
Standing is a requirement applicable to all parties who assert an original cause of
action, whether as counter-claim plaintiffs, cross-claim plaintiffs or third party plaintiffs.
"Anyone bringing an original proceeding—a dispute that is being presented to the courts
-1-

for the first time—must satisfy the traditional standing test. " Society of Professional
Journalists. Utah Chapter v. Vullock. 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987), citing Jenkins v. Swan.
675 P.2d at 1145 (Utah 1983).
The Kings next falsely claim that Mr. Henshaw filed a quite title action in this
case. (ICings Brief, page 28, ^ 3). That assertion is also a deliberate misstatement of the
facts of this case. Mr. Henshaw never filed a quite title action in this case.
On July 14, 2000, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed suit
against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress. (Record at 1-16). Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana
Henshaw filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a defendant on August 22,
2003. In their Amended Complaint, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw
again asserted causes of action for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Record at 467-481). At no time did Mrs.
Henshaw, Dee Henshaw or Dana Henshaw ever assert a cause of action for quite title
against the Kings or anyone else.
The Kings, however, asserted a counterclaim for quiet title in their answer to Mr.
Henshaw's original complaint. (Record at 24-31). The Kings also filed a counterclaim
for quiet title with their answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint. (Record at 486494).
Contrary to the Kings false assertions, it is the Kings who asserted a cause of
-2-

action for quiet title, not Mr. Henshaw. Therefore, under the holdings of Society of
Professional Journalists and Jenkins v. Swan, supra, the Kings, as the parties who first
asserted a cause of action for quiet title in their counterclaims, have the obligation to
prove they have standing to assert a claim for quiet title. The Kings have not met that
obligation, and they cannot meet that obligation. Therefore, the Kings lack standing to
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
A, THE KINGS CANNOT SATISFY ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR STANDING NECESSARY TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS9
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS, THE KINGS SOLD TO THE
WATROUSES. DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON
RAYMOND'S DEATH,
f 9 Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may
entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ^ 12, 154 P.3d 808.
Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act.
See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, *{
17, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse,
allowing in only those cases that are jit for judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor
v. Utah Bd of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))).
Gedo v. Rose. 163 P.3d 659 (UT 2007).
If 8 "[Tjhere are two means by which a party can establish standing—the
traditional test and an alternative test." Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah
Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, ^ 18, 148 P.3d960. Under the traditional test, a
party has standing if it meets three requirements:
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be "adversely affected by the
[challenged] actions." Second, the party must allege a causal relationship
"between the injury to the party, the [challenged] actions and the relief
requested." Third, the relief requested must be "substantially likely to redress the
injury claimed. " Id. ^19 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original)
(quoting Jenkins, 675 P. 2d at 1149-50). "Traditional standing criteria require that
the interests of the parties be adverse and that the party seeking relief have a
legally protectable interest in the controversy. "State ex rel. H.J. v. State, 1999 UT
-3-

App 238, \17, 986 P. 2d 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hogs R US v. Town of Fairfield. 207 P.3d 1221 (Utah 2009), citing Sierra Club v. Dept.
Of Environmental Quality. Div. Of Solid & Hazardous Waste. 857 P.2d 982
(Utah, 1993).
The Kings cannot satisfy any of the three requirements for standing to assert a
claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. Therefore, they do
not have standing to assert that Raymond' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death.
In order for the Kings to assert they have standing to claim that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, the Kings would have to show that they would
be directly and adversely affected if Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights
passed to Mildred Watrous upon his death. The Kings have not made such a showing,
and they cannot make such a showing.
At first the Kings claimed they merely let the Watrouses use some of their water,
however, the Kings later admitted that they sold the water rights to the Watrouses. At his
deposition on August 23, 2004, Jack King made the following admissions under oath:
3
5
6
7
8

Q. Okay. Then you're admitting here today, for
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3
hours full flow of Pinecreek water?
A. Every 18 days.
Q. Every 18 days; is that correct?
A. That's right.
(Page 59).
-4-

Because the Kings have admitted that they sold the Watrouses the water or water rights,
rather than merely letting the Watrouses use their water, the Kings cannot now claim, and
never could claim, that subsequent to their sale of the water rights to the Watrouses they
retained any ownership, or other interest in the water rights, they sold to the Watrouses,
that would be adversely affected if Raymond's interest in the water rights passed to
Mildred.
Because the Kings cannot show any direct interest in Raymond Watrous'
ownership of the water rights, after they sold the water rights to the Watrouses, the Kings
cannot show that they would be harmed or affected in any way whatsoever if Raymond's
interest in the water rights passed to Mildred upon his death. What is indisputable is that
no matter what happened to Raymond's interest in the water rights, it did not revert to the
Kings, as they falsely claim in their counterclaim to quiet title to Raymond's interest in
the water rights in themselves. After the sale of the water rights to the Watrouses, the
Kings had no interest in the water rights that could be affected by anything the Watrouses
did or did not do with the water rights, because at that the time of Raymond's death the
Kings did not have "a legally protectable interest, " in the water rights, whether or not
Raymond's interest in the water rights passed to Mildred upon Raymond's death, as
required by the holding in Hogs R US. supra.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, it did not pass to the Kings, and the
Kings have no standing, in this proceeding or any other proceeding, to claim that
Raymond's interest in the water right did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death.
-5-

Whether Raymond's interest in the water rights passed 100% to Mildred, 1/4 to Mildred
and 1/8 to each of his two children, 1/6 to Mildred and 1/6 to each of his two children or
passed to them in some other percentage, it is irrelevant in this proceeding. Whatever
happened to Raymond's interest in the water rights, it did not pass to the Kings, and the
Kings have no standing to assert any claim to the ownership of the water rights, because
the Kings simply cannot show that they have or ever had "a legally protectable interest, "
in the water rights that would be affected, whether or not Raymond's interest in the water
rights passed to Mildred upon Raymond's death.
If anyone had the legal right to assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights
did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, it would be those individuals defined as
"interestedpersons, " in UCA § 75-1-201.
In order for the Kings to assert that they have standing to claim that Raymond's
interest in the water rights, they sold to Watrouses, did not passed to Mildred at the time
the Raymond's death, the Kings would have to show that they are "interestedpersons, "
as defined in UCA § 75-1-201. The present version of UCA § 75-1-202 provides:
"Interestedperson" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust
estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes
persons having priority for appointment as personal representative, other
fiduciaries representing interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the
settlor's legal representative, if any, if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The
meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall
be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any
proceeding.
The Kings simply cannot qualify as "interestedpersons " under the provisions of

-6-

UCA § 75-1-202. Therefore, as a matter of law they would not have standing to assert, in
any probate proceeding, that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death.
In the case of In Re: Estate of Peterson. 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court declared:
'Interestedpersons" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against the estate
of a decedent which may be affected by the proceedings. U.C.A., 1953, § 75—1—
201(20) (1978 ed).
When a statute creates a cause of action and designates those who may sue under
it none except those designated may sue. Berry Properties v. City of Commerce
City, Colo.App., 667 P.2d247 (1983). (Emphasis added).
In this case, it is indisputable that the Kings cannot satisfy the requirements of the
Utah Probate Code to show that they are "interestedpersons, " as mandated in the Utah
Probate Code, in order to file a claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous. The Kings
have not claimed, and cannot claim, that they all are "heirs, devisees, children, spouses,
creditors, beneficiaries " of Raymond Watrous, or that they are "others having a property
right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of1 of Raymond Watrous. Therefore,
the Kings cannot establish, and have not established, that they have standing, or would
have had standing, to assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights, they sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, in any probate
proceeding.
Because, as a matter of law, the Kings never had standing to assert that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water, they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred
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Watrous upon Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding, they cannot establish that
they have any right to assert in a collateral proceeding that Raymond's interest in the
water, they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's. The Kings
cannot obtain greater legal rights in a collateral proceeding than they would have in a
direct probate proceeding. Therefore, the Kings have no standing to assert in this
proceeding that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond's death.1
B.

THE KINGS, NOT MR. HENSHAW. HAD THE BURDEN TO PROVE
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS,
THE KINGS SOLD TO THE WATROUSES. DID NOT PASS TO
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMONDS DEATH.
On page 29,1f 3, the Kings make the false assertion that:
The status of Raymond Watrous' water rights was not a 'claim' asserted by the
Kings or even an affirmative defense, because the issue did not raise matters
outside of Henshaw's prima facie case.

As with most, if not all of the Kings assertions, that assertion is a deliberate
misrepresentation of the facts and the relevant law.
As previously established, Mr. Henshaw never filed a cause of action to quiet title
to the water rights Mildred Watrous sold to his mother and his mother sold to him. On
July 14, 2000, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed suit against Jack
King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction of

1. Likewise the Kings have no standing to litigate the disposition of Raymond's
interest in the water rights in the interest of the public at large.
-8-

Emotional Distress. (Record at 1-16). On August 22, 2003, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee
Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed an amended complaint and again asserted causes of
action for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. (Record at 467-481). At no time did Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw
and Dana Henshaw ever assert a cause of action for quite title.
The Kings, however, asserted a counterclaim for quiet title in their answer to Mr.
Henshaw's original complaint. (Record at 24-31). The Kings also asserted a claim for
quiet title in their answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint. (Record at 486-494).
Therefore, and contrary to the Kings false assertions, it is they, as counterclaim plaintiffs,
asserting causes of action for quiet title, who had the burden to establish that they had
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. They did not do
so, and they cannot do so.
Furthermore, Jack King has admitted that Mr. Henshaw in fact owns the water
rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses. In his deposition Mr. King made the following
statements, under oath:
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4

Q. Now, my question for you, Mr. King, is you
claim in your response in paragraph No. 25 that the
plaintiffs have no water right, but in paragraph 20 you
— 21 you say they're using more than their fair share.
If they don't have any water right, how can they have a
fair share?
A. Well, you—you've already established with
Grace Potter that I deeded them over the three hours.
Q. You deeded them over the three hours?
-9-

5
6
7
8

A. That's right
Q. Okay. So they own the three hours; is that
correct?
A. I guess they do. (Jack King Deposition pages 9-10).

Based on Jack King's own admission, the Kings are legally estopped to even assert that
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw. Therefore, Mr. Henshaw had no duty
to prove that Raymond's interest in the water rights passed to Mildred upon Raymond's
death, even if he had asserted a cause of action for quiet title, which he did not do.
C. THE KINGS ASSERTION THAT THEY HAVE STANDING TO CLAIM
THAT RAYMOND'S INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS. THE KINGS
SOLD TO THE WATROUSES. DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED UPON
RAYMOND'S DEATH BECAUSE THEY HAVE A PERSONAL STAKE IN
THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE IS YET ANOTHER DELIBERATE
MISREPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND THE RELEVANT LAW.
The Kings assertion that they have standing to claim that Raymond's interest in the
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death, is another deliberate misrepresentation of the facts and relevant law.
In district court, standing is not determined by the amount of damages sought by a
plaintiff. The fact that a defendant is subject to personal liability in a lawsuit does not
confer standing on the defendant to assert claims on behalf of third parties or causes of
actions, that if they exist at all, belong to third parties.
The Kings do not have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death, simply because they are subject to some personal liability in this case.
In order for the Kings to have standing to assert that Raymond's interest in the water
-10-

lights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death,
the Kings would have to "show some distinct and palpable injury" that they suffered at
the time Raymond Watrous died, if his interest in the water rights passed to Mildred. The
Kings have not done that, and they cannot do that. Whether or not the Kings may be
exposed to personal liability and damages in this case is irrelevant.
The Kings cannot base their standing on any liability and/or damages they may be
subject to in this case. The Kings can only claim standing to assert that the water rights,
the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond
Watrous5 death, if they can prove "show some distinct and palpable injury" that they
suffered at the time Raymond died, or would have suffered, at the time of Raymond's
death, if his interest in the water rights passed to Mildred. They cannot do that.
Therefore, they do not now have, and never did have, standing to assert that Raymond's
interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond's death.2
POINT II
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE IS NOT TIME BARRED.
Because the trial court never had jurisdiction to hear or rule on the Kings' claim
that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did
not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is not time
barred. Therefore, as a matter of law, that portion of the trial court's Order on Motions

2. The Kings also have not shown, and cannot show, any significant public interest in
the ownership of the water rights, that would give them standing to litigate the disposition
of Raymond's interest in the water rights in the interest of the public at large.
-11-

for Directed Verdict, holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold
to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, is void, and a void
judgment can be challenged at any time in any proceeding. See Authority of the City of
Salt Lake v. Snyder Housing. 67 P.3d 1055 (Utah 2002).
In Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
declared:
[TJhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void The one-year [threemonth, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made within a
Ir
reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4),
cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A voidjudgment cannot
acquire validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor.
Because, the Kings never had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in
the water rights, the Kings sold to Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death, the trial court never had jurisdiction to even consider or rule on the
Kings' assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings admit they sold to
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death.
Standing is jurisdictional, and a party cannot litigate the claims of another party.
See Gedo v. Rose: supra, holding:
Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act.
See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74,
^17, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse,
allowing in only those cases that arefitfor judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor
v. Utah Bd of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))).
(Emphasis added).
Furthermore, standing is an issue that is never waived and can be raised at any time. See.
Inre: Estate of Hunt 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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Standing, of course, is an issue that is never waived and can be raised by any
party or by the court at any time. See Terracor, 716 P. 2d at 798; Stromquist, 646
P.2dat 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v.
lions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P. 2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Because standing is jurisdictional, because standing can be raised at any time and
is never waived, because without standing a court has no jurisdiction to act, and because
the Kings cannot satisfy the requirements for standing to assert that Raymond Watrous'
interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, that portion of the trial court's order on Motion
for Directed Verdict holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death is void, as a
matter of law, because the trial court never had jurisdiction to even hear, much less, rule
on the Kings assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death. Because an order
entered by a court without jurisdiction to enter the order is void as a matter of law, Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is timely, because as the Utah Supreme Court stated in
Garcia v. Garcia, supra:
[TJhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year [threemonth, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made within a
"reasonable time, " which seems literally to apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4),
cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A void judgment cannot
acquire validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor. (Emphasis
added).
Because that portion of the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict,
holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
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Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, is void for lack of
jurisdiction, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate was timely, and the trial court committed
reversible and prejudicial error when it denied it.3

POINT III
THAT PORTION OF THE ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
HOLDING THAT RAYMOND WATROUS9 INTEREST IN THE WATER
RIGHTS, THE KINGS SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, DID NOT PASS TO
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH IS VOID AS A MATTER
OF LAW, NOT MERELY VOIDABLE.
The Kings falsely assert that the part of trial court's Order on Motions for Directed
Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death is merely voidable, rather than
void. The assertion is a misrepresentation of the facts of this case and the relevant and
controlling law.
As established in Point I and Point II, of this Brief, that part of the trial court's
Order on Motions for Directed Verdict, holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's
death is void because the Kings do not have standing to assert that Raymond's interest in
the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond's death.

3. The defendant's citations to various federal and state cases discussing what is a
reasonable time to file a Rule 60(b) motion, under the FRCP, are not only irrelevant, they
are deliberately misleading. In none of the cases cited by the Kings was there an issue of
the basic subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. None of those cases are controlling
or even relevant to the facts of this case.
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Because standing is jurisdictional, Gedo v. Rose, supra, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to hear or rule upon the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to even hear or rule upon the Kings
claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Waatrous upon Raymond's death, that portion of the
trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is void as a matter of law.
If a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment or order issued by that court is void as a
matter of law.
"[A] judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or because some
irregularity inhered in its rendition. It is void only if the court that rendered it
lackedjurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process."Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 221 Kan.
17, 558 P.2d 101, 104 (1976) (emphasis added)
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. Inc.. 817 P.2d 382 (Ut App. 1991).
*f 10 Although Melvin does not present it as such, the challenge to personal
jurisdiction in the context of an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is
properly brought under Rule 60(b)(4), which permits the trial court to relieve a
party from a void judgment See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); see also Richins v.
Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (stating
judgment '"is void only if the court that rendered it lackedjurisdiction of the
subject matter or of the parties' ") (citation omitted).
Franklin Convey Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin. 2 P.3d 451 (Ut. App. 2000).
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to even hear or rule upon the Kings
claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, under clear and
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controlling Utah law, that portion of the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed
Verdict is void as a matter of law, not merely voidable, as the Kings falsely assert.
POINT IV
MR. HENSHAW'S APPEAL IS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF "THE
LAW OF THE CASE.'5
Contrary to the Kings assertion, Mr. Henshaw's appeal is not barred by the
doctrine of "The Law of the Case."
The Kings assert in Point III of their brief that Mr. Henshaw's appeal is barred by
the Doctrine of "The Law of the Case." However, the Kings also admit this Court has
never ruled on Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear or
consider the Kings' assertion that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the
Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
(Kings' brief page 24, ^ 2). Therefore, the doctrine of "The Law of the Case," cannot
possibly apply to Mr. Henshaw's appeal, because this Court has not made any ruling with
respect to Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings' do not have standing to claim that
Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to
Mildred upon Raymond's death, that became "The Law of the Case."
Nothing trumps jurisdiction! The doctrine of "Law of the Case" cannot trump
jurisdiction. As previously established in this Brief, because the Kings do not have
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, the district court
never had jurisdiction to even consider or rule on the Kings assertion that Raymond's
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interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond's death. Because the trial court never had jurisdiction to even consider or rule
on the Kings assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, the doctrine of "The Law of
the Case" is inapplicable in this matter, whether under The Mandate Rule, The Prior
Ruling Rule or The Final Decision Rule.4
POINT V
THE KINGS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Kings assert that they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this case,
because, as the Kings claim, Mr. Henshaw's appeal is frivolous. In support of this claim,
the Kings make two assertions; 1) there is no evidence that Raymond Watrous died, and
2) the jury did not find that the Kings sold the water rights to the Watrouses and those
water rights were ultimately transferred to Mr. Henshaw.
The Kings assertion that there is no evidence that Raymond Watrous died is
laughable at best. The Kings entire case is based on the fact that Raymond's interest in
the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond's death. They cannot now claim that Raymond did not die. The Kings have
stipulated that he is dead by filing two counterclaims seeking to quiet title to his portion
of the water rights that they admit they sold to the Watrouses. The Kings specifically

4. Because none of the cases cited by the Kings in their brief involved the basic
jurisdiction of the court, they are inapplicable to the facts of this case, and their holdings
are totally irrelevant.
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claim in their counterclaims that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to
Mildred upon Raymond's death. Are the Kings asserting that Raymond's interest in the
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death, but that he is not dead4? That
assertion is beyond laughable!
The Kings claim that the jury did not rule that the water rights, the Kings sold to
the Watrouses, passed to Mr. Henshaw. While it is true that the jury verdict form did not
seek a determination that the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not
ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw, it was undisputed that the Kings sold a certain amount
of water and/or water rights to the Watrouses. It was also undisputed that Mildred
Watrous sold all of the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses to Barbara Henshaw
and that Barbara Henshaw sold all of the water rights she bought from Mrs. Watrous to
Dee Henshaw.
The jury was unaware that Judge Lee had granted the Kings' motion for a directed
verdict and ruled that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights had not passed to
Mildred Watrous upon his death and, therefore, did not pass to Mr. Henshaw. Therefore,
when the jury determined that the Kings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted
in them, the jury was in fact ruling that Mr. Henshaw owned all of the water and/or water
rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, because the Kings had admitted they sold the
water and/or water rights to the Watrouses, and it was undisputed that Mildred Watrous
sold all of the water and/or water rights to Barbara Henshaw and that Barbara Henshaw
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sold all of the water and/or these water rights to Dee Henshaw.5
Mr. Henshaw5s appeal is based on indisputable facts and clear and controlling
Utah Law, unlike the Kings assertions that are based on deliberate misrepresentations of
both fact and law. Even if this Court should affirm the district court's decision, Mr.
Henshaw5 s appeal of the decision is not frivolous or in bad faith. Therefore, even if this
Court affirms the district court's decision, the Kings are not still not entitled to an award
of attorney's fees.
POINT VI
MR. HENSHAW IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THIS CASE BECAUSE THE KINGS' OPPOSITION TO HIS APPEAL IS
SPURIOUS, DISINGENUOUS, AND IS FILED IN BAD FAITH, AT BEST.
Throughout their brief, the Kings deliberately make false assertions of fact and
false representations of the law. Their opposition to Mr. Henshaw's Appeal is spurious,
disingenuous, at best, and is filed in bad faith.
In their brief, the Kings make the following false assertions of fact, among others:
1) Mr. Henshaw filed a quiet title action; (King brief, page 2, U 3); 2) the Kings are
simply defendants in this action; (King brief, page 30, ^ 2); 3) the Kings quiet title causes
of action are simply responses to Mr. Henshaw's Complaints; (King brief, page 28, ^f 2);
4) at the close of Mr. Henshaw's case the district court allowed Mr. Henshaw to assert a
quiet title action; (King brief, page 5, paragraph numbered 3); 5) the district court

5. Although the jury did determine that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use the water,
it did so because he failed to file an application for a change of diversion with the Utah
Department of Water Resources, as he was required to do before he used the water.
However, his failure to file an application for a change of diversion with the Utah
Department of Water Resources did not affect his ownership of the water.
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implicitly ruled that the Kings have standing; (King brief, page 15, ^ 3); 6) as the
plaintiff in a quiet title action, Mr. Henshaw had the burden of proving that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the waterrights,the Kings sold to the Watrouses, passed to Mildred
Watrous upon Raymond's death, (King brief, page 28, ^f 3); 7) The status of Raymond
Watrous' waterrightswas not a "claim" asserted by the Kings or even as an affirmative
defense, (King brief, page 29, *f 3); 8) whether defendants had standing or not, Mr.
Henshaw was required to prove that he had title to the water rights, (King brief, page 29,
U 4); 9) it was the Henshaws that sued the Kings, not the other way around, (King brief,
page 30, Tf 1); and 10) that Raymond Watrous died is not a fact. (King brief, page 34-35,
14-1).
The Kings also made the following misrepresentations of law, among others: 1) a
judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction is subject to the time provisions of Rule
60(b)(4) URCP, (King brief, page 14, f 2); 2) even if the Kings lack standing, the trial
court's order on the King's motion for a directed verdict is not void, (King brief, page 1617, Tfs 3-1); 3) "The Doctrine of the Law of Case" applies to void judgments, (King brief,
page 30, Tf 1), 4) standing is applicable only to plaintiffs, (King brief, page 28, ^ 2); 5) the
status of Raymond Watrous' water rights did not raise matters outside Mr. Henshaw's
causes of action for Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, (King brief, page 29, ^f 3),
As previously established in this Brief, the Kings simply do not have standing, and
never had standing, to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the waterrights,the
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Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
Neither the Kings nor the district court has ever been able to explain how the Kings have
standing to assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon
Raymond's death.
Also, as previously established in this brief, whatever happened to Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights, it did not pass to the Kings, and the Kings do not
now have, and never had, any legal right to the water rights, once they sold them to the
Watrouses. Therefore, as a matter of law, they have no standing to claim that the water
rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
The jury at the trial of this matter ruled that the water rights did not pass to the
ICings, and the Kings did not appeal that decision. Therefore, they are now estopped to
assert that they have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights
did not pass to Mildred Watrous, because the jury ruled at the trial of this matter that the
Kings have no interest in the water rights. Ergo, the Kings opposition to Mr. Henshaw's
appeal is spurious, disingenuous, in bad faith and a per se violation of Rule 40 URAP.
The Kings bad faith in opposing Mr. Henshaw's appeal is not only demonstrated
by their deliberate misstatements of fact and misrepresentations of the relevant law, but
also by their failure to even attempt to address and/or distinguish the holdings of Society
of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter vr Vullock: Gedo v. Rose: In Re: Estate of
Peterson: Garcia v. Garcia: Richins v Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. Inc.: and Franklin
Convey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin as they apply to this case. Because the Kings have
deliberately misrepresented the facts of this case and misstated the relevant law, their
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opposition to Mr. Henshaw's appeal is in bad faith and a per se violation of Rule 40
URAP. Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 40 URAP and Rule 33 URAP,
Mr. Henshaw should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this
appeal and in defending the Kings' spurious, disingenuous action to quiet title to
Raymond's interest in the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
When the facts are understood, and the relevant controlling law is applied to those
facts, it is indisputable that the Kings never had standing to assert that Raymond
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, and, therefore, the district court never had
jurisdiction to hear or rule on the Kings' causes of action seeking to quite title to
Raymond's interest in the water rights in themselves. Because the district court lacked
jurisdiction to even to hear or rule on the Kings' causes of action seeking to quite title to
Raymond's interest in the water rights in themselves, as a matter of law, that portion of
the district court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is void. Therefore, Mr:Henshaw respectfully requests that this court reverse that portion Order on Motions for
Directed Verdict holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to
die Watrouses did not pass to Mildred upon his death.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August 200&

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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